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NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AC-
TION. By Louis L. Jaffe. Boston: Little, Brown & Com-
pany. 1965. Pp. xvi, 792. $20.00.
In this excellent, significant work, Professor Jaffe makes a major
contribution to the understanding of government by means of adminis-
trative agencies and of the related actions of courts. His thesis, as stated
in the Preface, is "that agencies and courts are in a partnership of law-
making and law-applying" which operates in a matrix of authority
bestowed by the legislature, within constitutional limits. The book
explores all aspects of its subject, including the historical and constitu-
tional foundations of governmental powers, the procedures by which
judicial decisions are brought to bear, along with administrative actions,
on a common subject matter, and the resulting division of labor in carry-
ing out the deciding function. Internal agency procedures are not
covered. State law is interwoven with federal law or discussed in juxta-
position to federal law throughout.
As the Preface also explains, much of the book has been published
previously in law review articles that have here been revised and brought
up to date; and these have been supplemented by several new chapters
which round out the subject and tie it together. The text achieves unity
and coherence. The publishers have recently announced a student edition
which omits the last three chapters. These are new, but carry the main
thought into supplementary areas that are not often reached in law
school courses.
The entire work is a commentary in the best sense of the term,
examining the reasons for doctrines and decisions, determining their
historical, logical, and practical soundness, and applying a critical judg-
ment to the whole. A vast amount of reading and of inquiry into affairs
lies behind this book, and a beautiful objectivity enters into its conclu-
sions. Professor Jaffe serves no cause other than the cause of understand-
ing and improving the law. His conclusions, expressed with moderation
and with deference when appropriate, reflect attachment to the values of
freedom and welfare which Anglo-American legal development has on
the whole fostered, and to the continued service of these values in the
operation of legal institutions today. No slogans or ciches obscure his
perception of the realities involved. The author's quest is for wise deci-
sions; the approach is typically that of the judicial statesman, seeking
sound answers to problems that arise when, as is so often the case, enacted
law leaves room for choice.
Such a work is primarily an aid to learning and reflection, rather than
a tool for advocates in search of authoritative support for predetermined
positions. The references to decisions are properly selective, although on
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numerous points the varying holdings and lines of reasoning of different
courts are set forth in footnotes. Well over 2,000 cases are cited in all,
together with a selection of statutes and of scholarly writings. Apart from
these citations and the views of the author himself, which will surely
carry weight with many courts, the analyses of issues will be of genuine
value in the preparation of briefs. The book is highly useful for law
students as well, and will hereafter be indispensable to serious scholar-
ship in its field.
Since the functions of agencies and of courts rest ultimately on the
constitutional allocation of governmental powers, including the legisla-
tive power to allocate further, Jaffe deals with this subject in chapters 2
and 3, after an introductory summary of current problems surrounding
the operation of administrative agencies. His conclusion that the issue of
constitutional validity of delegations of "legislative power" is not dead in
the federal system, as well as in the states, but that ultimate solutions
remain elusive, seems to me to be sound. The chapter on Constitutional
Competence of Court and Agency, which is newly written, contains an
extraordinarily perceptive discussion, blending history, logic, and prac-
tical considerations. For example, in the author's discussion of the proper
initial roles of agencies and courts in such harsh actions against private
interest as license revocation and imposition of fines, he takes full
account of traditional concepts of "judicial" and "administrative" func-
tions, the influence of long-standing practice, and the relative availability
and effectiveness of agencies and courts for performing the required
tasks.
Chapter 4 discusses primary jurisdiction and is followed by five
chapters which deal, essentially, with the availability of judicial review of
agency action. These cover the scheme of remedies and of other occasions
for judicial consideration of agency regulations, orders, and acts; sover-
eign immunity; and the general sweep of the right to review and of
exclusions from it. Here again the discussion weighs, in a delicate
balance, the many pertinent considerations bearing on successive points.
As to possible loss of the right to challenge an agency rule or order in a
penal proceeding to enforce it, because of failure to employ statutory
administrative and judicial remedies that were available originally,1 one
could argue that greater account might well have been taken of the need
for expeditious enforcement, of the awkwardness of the processes of a
trial court to determine validity when a full administrative record is not
available, and of the enhancement of difficulties by a long lapse of time.2
I Pp. 196, 264-265, 384-389, 390-393, 450 et seq. The discussion of this matter is
conduded as part of the treatment of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
2See, however, pp. 393-394, where the unsuitability of jury determination of the
validity of an order is discussed.
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The general conclusion on this point, that flat rules are generally absent
and that the final determination of roles should lie with the courts when
constitutional issues are involved, is nevertheless sound.
Chapters 10 through 13 deal with prerequisites to judicial review-
ripeness, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and standing. The
author makes his way skillfully and discerningly through the thicket of
overlapping concepts involved and the welter of subtly differing agency
regulations, orders, and pronouncements to which these concepts relate.
He takes cognizance, too, of the varying application of these concepts in
the several kinds of judicial proceedings in which they arise. He states
his conclusions in this area, as in others, clearly but undogmatically.
In chapters 14 through 16, which deal with the scope of judicial re-
view of agency action, Professor Jaffe realistically points to the element of
judgment, or "intuitive leap," that is involved in every kind of determi-
nation, whether denominated a determination of law or of fact-or
something else-that requires a resolution of conflict or difficulty in the
basis of decision. 3 Fact itself is an inference from evidence, not something
that can be known with complete certitude; and the application of a rule
of law which allows any choice whatever requires that the decision be
made on some basis that lies outside the rule itself, if only in the under-
standing of a doubtful word used in the rule. Any such determination,
along with those which result from the expressed power to make choices
for achieving prescribed purposes (such as the power to formulate rules
for guarding machines in the interest of safety), is likely to be made on
the basis of facilitating the ends which the deciding authority has in
mind-which means, in the case of an administrative agency or of a
court reviewing its action, its conception of the purpose of the governing
statute. There is therefore a continuum of powers of choice, to which
Jaffe applies the term "discretion," involved in all kinds of determina-
tions of doubtful questions. In the sequence which involves court review
of agency determinations, the two bodies play their respective roles as to
the same determinations, in the "partnership" the author envisages. The
court, which has the last word, necessarily determines ultimately the
allocation of authority between agency and court. When inferences from
evidence as to present or past phenomena dominate a decision, the ques-
tion is one of "fact" for review purposes, and the court recognizes the
agency's conclusion as final if there is substantial evidence in its support;
but if the meaning of a statutory word (such as "employee") is also in
issue, "the dispute must be resolved by reference to the purpose of the
statute and the question is thus one of law." 4
'See pp. 550-556.
'P. 551.
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In a passage which follows, Jaffe seems to equate resolving questions
of law, which ordinarily are considered interpretative, and "law making"
in the sense of developing new rules.5 They may be so equated, because
of the element of choice in interpretation; but further along he recog-
nizes that "adopting and then applying" a rule (including, it would seem,
interpretation of it) may arise successively in a determination. In some
contexts, agencies may be allowed to play a primary and influential, but
of course not an unlimited, role in either or both.6
The author views the problem of scope of review primarily from the
standpoint of a court which has the reviewing task to perform. A different
approach to allocating authority between agency and court is possible,
however-the approach of the statutory draftsman or legislator who is
trying as best he can to prescribe a sound division of labor in advance of
the actual execution of the powers he is bestowing. For him it may be
useful to reserve the term "discretion" for the power, which may be
explicitly bestowed, to make subordinate choices of policy with finality,
and thereby to "make law"; to distinguish from this function the as-
certainment of past or present phenomena which, as the author brings
out, may relate to "facts" that are regarded as having objective existence
independently of determinations about them; and to seek to prescribe,
when feasible, verbal guides to decision which are to have the force of
"law," and the interpretation of which presents questions "of" law.
Nothing Jaffe writes is inconsistent with this approach; he only stresses
the problems that must continue to arise at the reviewing stage because
of the inadequacy of statutory words to operate with complete precision
and because statutes must be applied to changing conditions.
The three concluding chapters deal with Judicial Stays Pending
Administrative Action, Judicial Stays Pending Judicial Review, and the
allocation of jurisdiction over a proceeding, as between court and agency,
during and after judicial review. These are to a large extent pioneering
treatments of their subjects, and are correspondingly valuable. Certainly
they are not less important from a practical standpoint than the more
traditionally recognized topics that relate to judicial review.
Careful workmanship and attractive format characterize this work
as a whole. Typographical errors have not been avoided altogether, but
none that I noticed is other than obvious or affects the meaning signifi-
cantly. Some questionable citations are bound to occur in so detailed a
study, involving so many jurisdictions, and there probably are a few in
this book. It is difficult to see, for example, how Russell v. Johnson,7 an
r Pp. 553-555.
6 Pp. 563-565.
7220 Ind. 649, 46 N.E.2d 219 (1943), cited in footnote 24 on p. 557.
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Indiana case, can be said to support the proposition, for which it is
cited, that some courts "in reviewing a workmen's compensation award
make an independent determination in every case." The case supports
such a practice by the full state Industrial Board in reviewing a single
member's decision, but it limits the courts (in an "independent action"
for review) to ascertaining "if, in the broad sense, the requirements of
due process have been met," including whether there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the Board's determinations of fact.
RALPH F. Fucist
t Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
498
